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Abstract
The probability ‘measure’ for measurements at two consecutive mo-
ments of time is non-additive. These probabilities, on the other hand,
may be determined by the limit of relative frequency of measured events,
which are by nature additive. We demonstrate that there are only two
ways to resolve this problem. The first solution places emphasis on the
precise use of the concept of conditional probability for successive mea-
surements. The physically correct conditional probabilities define additive
probabilities for two-time measurements. These probabilities depend ex-
plicitly on the resolution of the physical device and do not, therefore,
correspond to a function of the associated projection operators. It follows
that quantum theory distinguishes between physical events and proposi-
tions about events, the latter are not represented by projection operators
and that the outcomes of two-time experiments cannot be described by
quantum logic.
The alternative explanation is rather radical: it is conceivable that the
relative frequencies for two-time measurements do not converge, unless
a particular consistency condition is satisfied. If this is true, a strong
revision of the quantum mechanical formalism may prove necessary. We
stress that it is possible to perform experiments that will distinguish the
two alternatives.
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory. It provides a set of rules that
allows us to associate probabilities to specific physical events. There is little
doubt that these rules have been proved remarkably successful in the description
of any physical phenomenon that we have been able to study experimentally,
but gravitational ones.
∗anastop@physics.upatras.gr
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The reasoning in terms of probability in physical theories, however, is not
entirely unproblematic. Most discussions about the interpretation of quantum
theory – and the associated ”paradoxes”– are related to the appropriate use of
quantum probabilities. Some of the issues raised are not specifically quantum
– they refer to the physical applicability of the general concepts of probability
theory and date at least back to Boltzmann.
One may ask, for instance, whether the probabilities are subjective or objective–
namely whether they refer to our knowledge about a physical system or to the
physical system itself. In the latter case, one may further ask whether probabil-
ities refer to an individual system –denoting perhaps its propensity to manifest
one behavior or another- or to statistical ensembles. One may also question
whether there exists a sample space for quantum phenomena, or all predictions
have to make reference to a concrete measurement set-up.
There exists a common denominator in all interpretations of probability,
either classical or quantum. We may not agree whether probabilities refer to the
properties of the things themselves or not , but we do accept that probabilities
refer to the statistics of measurement outcomes. Probabilities may or may not
be physically meaningful a priori (before an experiment), but they can definitely
be determined a posteriori, namely after a large number of experimental runs.
The probability of an event is defined as the limit of the relative frequency
of this event as the number of trials goes to infinity. It may be argued that this
is not the only way we employ probability in physics – after all statistical argu-
ments enter into the design and preparation of any experiment. Still, whenever
we want to compare the theoretical probabilities with concrete empirical data,
we invariably employ the relation of probability to event frequencies.
In this paper we analyse the basic properties of quantum mechanical proba-
bility for two-time measurements in two consecutive moments of time (two-time
measurements). The key point of our argumentation is the empirical determi-
nation of probabilities as limits of relative frequencies. We employ this relation
without committing to a frequency interpretation of probability [1]– we need not
assume that probability, as a concept, is defined as a limit of relative frequencies.
Neither do we commit to a specific interpretation of quantum theory. We only
assume that the outcomes of measurements (that have actually been performed)
are described by the probabilities obtained from the rules of quantum theory.
Quantum mechanical probabilities may refer to other aspects of physical reality,
but we need not make such an assumption. This thesis can hardly be rejected
by any interpretation of quantum theory.
In a two-time measurement one determines specific properties of a physical
system at two successive moments of time. The measurement outcomes may be
sampled in the same manner they are sampled in the single-time measurements.
Probabilities are then still determined by the limits of relative frequencies. We
may still employ the rules of quantum theory to associate a probability to each
possible measurement outcome. The problem is that the quantum mechani-
cal probability ‘measure’ for two-time histories does not satisfy the additivity
property of probabilities. On the other hand, relative frequencies are always
additive, since they are constructed by counting specific and indivisible physical
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events.
We next proceed to resolve this conflict. A physical theory must explain
the observed phenomena – namely the frequencies of measured events. If these
frequencies define probabilities, we have to accept that the conventional rule
for probabilities of two-time measurements fails. We show that the derivation
of this rule employs the concept of conditional probability in a rather ambigu-
ous way. We address this problem and define thereby additive probabilities for
two-time measurements. But the new probability assignment depends explic-
itly on the resolution of the physical device. The probabilities assigned to a
specific sample set of measurements depend therefore on the physical character-
istics of the apparatus and they are not a function of the associated projection
operators. Projection operators cannot represent events universally. It follows
that the YES-NO experiments [2] cannot reconstruct all probabilistic aspects
of a physical system, and for this reason the outcomes of two-time experiments
cannot be represented by any form of quantum logic.
The alternative is rather radical, but cannot be a priori rejected. It is con-
ceivable that the relative frequencies for the two-time measurements do not
converge (see [3] for a relevant interpretation of quantum probability ). In that
case, probabilities can only be defined for two-time events that satisfy a con-
sistency condition –the same condition that appears in the consistent histories
interpretation of quantum theory [4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The failure of the frequencies
to converge is eventually due to the interference between the two alternatives.
This alternative explanation implies, of course, that one would need an all-new
reformulation of quantum theory.
It is important to emphasise that the two possible resolutions of our problem
may be empirically distinguished. It is possible – in theory and we believe in
practice too– to design experiments that will determine whether the relative
frequencies of two-time events converge or not. Either way, such experiments
would shed much light in many counter-intuitive aspects of quantum probability.
2 Probabilities for two-time measurements
First we describe the relation of probabilities to event frequencies. We assume
an ensemble of a large number of identically prepared systems. In each system
we measure some physical properties say A, which take value in a set Ω. We
then perform the measurements one by one – thus constructing a sequence AN
of points of Ω, where N is an integer that labels the experiments. We next
sample the measurement outcomes into subsets U of Ω1.
1In standard probability theory such sets are denoted as events, because they represent
possible outcomes of the measurement process. Not any subset of Ω can play that role – unless
Ω is a denumerable set. In the standard theory U are usually taken to be Borel sets, namely
sets that can be obtained from denumerable unions and intersections of the open subsets of Ω.
The description of probabilities in terms of frequencies, however, is related directly to sampling
of measurement outcomes. If Ω is a continuous set, Borel subsets consisting of discrete points
are irrelevant to what we may actually measure and should be, therefore, excluded.
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We next define n(U,N) as the number of times that the result of the mea-
surement is found in U in the first N experiments. It is evident that n(U,N)
satisfies the following properties
n(U,N) ≥ n(U,M), ifN > M (2. 1)
n(U ∪ V,N) = n(U,N) + n(V,N), ifU ∩ V = ∅ (2. 2)
n(Ω, N) = N (2. 3)
n(∅, N) = 0 (2. 4)
One then may define the a-posteriori probability that an event in U has been
realised as
p(U) = lim
N→∞
n(U,N)
N
, (2. 5)
provided the limit exists. These probabilities satisfy all axioms of ordinary
probability.
We then consider a measurement at two successive moment of time. At time
t = 0 a particle described the density matrix ρˆ0 is emitted from a source. At
time t1 it passes through a device, which measures its position. The device
may simply consist of a thin strip of a medium, which registers a track of the
particles that penetrate it. The particle then passes at time t2 > t1 from an
identical measurement device, which we placed immediately behind the first. It
leaves a second track there.
The experiment described above may be repeatedN times, each time record-
ing the mark left by the particle on the measurement devices. To study the
statistics of the measurements, we split the possible values of particle position
at each moment of time into a set of n exclusive alternatives. Each alternative
labelled by the index i corresponds to a subset Ui of the real line, such that
∪iUi = R and Ui ∩ Uj = ∅, for i 6= j.
The sample space Ω = R2 for the two-times measurements is partitioned
into the n2 sets Uij = Ui×Uj, which are labelled by the ordered pair of integers
(i, j). From the results of the measurements we may immediately read the
numbers n(Uij , N). According to the relation between relative frequencies and
probabilities these numbers should satisfy
n(Uij , N)
N
→ p(Ui, t1;Uj, t2), (2. 6)
as N → ∞. Here p(Ui, t1;Uj, t2) refers to the probability first i and then j are
realised.
The rules of quantum theory allow us to express this probability in terms of
the projection operators Pˆi that correspond to the interval Ui of the particle’s
position.
p(Ui, t1;Uj, t2) = Tr(QˆjPˆiρ(t1)Pˆi), (2. 7)
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where we denoted for simplicity Qj = e
iHˆ(t2−t1)Pje
−iHˆ(t2−t1). Hˆ the Hamil-
tonian of the particle and ρ(t1) the initial density matrix evolved until time
t1.
Suppose, however, that we want to consider the probability that the particle
first crossed through either U1 or U2 and then through Uj. The projection
operator corresponding to U1∪U2 is Pˆ1+Pˆ2, hence the corresponding probability
is
p(U1 ∪ U2, t1;Uj, t2) = Tr(Qˆj(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2)ρˆ(t1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2))
= p(U1, t1;Uj , t2) + p(U2, t1;Uj, t2) + 2Re d(U1, U2, t1;Uj , t2), (2. 8)
where
d(U1, U2, t1;Uj, t2) = Tr(QˆjPˆ1ρˆ(t1)Pˆ2) (2. 9)
is known as the decoherence functional in the consistent histories approach. It
provides a measure of the interference between the events 1 and 2.
On the other hand the elementary properties of the frequencies n(Uij , N)
state that n([U1 ∪U2]×Uj , N) = n(U1×Uj , N)+n(U2×Uj , N), so that in the
limit N →∞
p(U1 ∪ U2, t1;Uj, t2) = p(U1, t1; , Uj, t2) + p(U2, t1;Uj , t2) (2. 10)
In other words, the quantum mechanical probabilities are not additive (unless
the consistency condition Red(U1, U2, t1;Uj , t2) = 0 is satisfied), while the mea-
sured frequencies of events are additive. We shall see that there exist only two
possible resolutions to the problem. The first one is close to conventional wis-
dom about quantum theory, but has, nonetheless, disturbing implications. The
other is more radical, but cannot be discounted a priori.
3 Probabilities are contextual
3.1 The correct use of conditional probability
Our first alternative involves the assumption that the sequences (2.6) converge,
while the second that they do not converge. In the former case the physically
relevant probabilities are defined by the limit of the relative frequencies. These
probabilities are a datum of experiment, and as such they should be explained
by the physical theory. If the theory fails in that regard, then there must be
a mistake somewhere in the analysis. It follows that if the probabilities can be
defined, the derivation of equation (2.7) should be reexamined.
We start from a density matrix ρˆ at t = 0, which is evolved unitarily until
time t1, when the particle enters the measuring device. If we register the particle
in the interval labelled by i, the outcoming density matrix will equal
Pˆiρˆ(t1)Pˆi
Tr(ρˆ(t1)Pˆi)
. (3. 1)
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We need make no commitments about the interpretation of the measurement
process. It is irrelevant whether the measuring device is classical like in Copen-
hagen quantum theory, or quantum mechanical and a physical process of wave
packet reduction has taken place. And it makes little difference whether the
density matrix refers to an individual system, or a statistical ensemble, because
at the end of the day our results will be interpreted by statistical processing of
the measurement outcomes. What is important is that the density matrix (3.1)
allows us to compute the conditional probabilities that the event j takes place
at t2 provided the event i took place at t1
Tr
(
Pˆiρˆ(t1)PˆiQˆj
)
Tr(ρˆ(t1)Pˆi)
, (3. 2)
from which the classical definition of conditional probability leads us to expres-
sion (2.7) for the probability that first the event i takes place at t1 and then the
event j takes place at time t2.
The problem lies in equation (3.1). If, instead of sampling the measurement
outcomes in the set, say U1, we sampled it into U1∪U2, we would have employed
the projector Pˆ1 + Pˆ2 and the out-coming density matrix would read
(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2)ρˆ(t1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2)
Tr(ρˆ(t1)(Pˆ1 + Pˆ2)))
. (3. 3)
We would then obtain the result (2.8), which is inconsistent with the probabil-
ities defined through relative frequency.
However, there is no a priori reason to use equation (3.1) for the out-coming
density matrix. The action of the projection Pˆi depends on our choice of sam-
pling of measurement outcomes and not on the measurement outcome itself.
What has actually taken place is that the particle left a mark on a specific
point, and we then choose to place that point into one or the other set. If
we had a measurement at a single moment of time, this would not have been
a problem, because the density matrix (3.1) does not appear in any physical
predictions for single-time measurements. In a single-time measurement the
only physically relevant quantities are the probabilities Tr(Pˆiρˆ(t1)), which are
additive and for this reason they do not depend on our choice of sampling.
In the two-time measurement, however, the probabilities turn out to be non-
additive, and this should urge some caution on the use of conditional probability.
If we sample events into larger sets than the ones being manifested in the exper-
iments, then we employ less information than what we have actually obtained.
Our use of conditional probabilities will be, therefore, improper. (See the dis-
cussion in [9] about the way conditional probabilities may lead to erroneous
predictions, if we fail to make use of all available information.)
The physically correct procedure would be to incorporate in our probabil-
ities all information that has been obtained from the measurements. In other
words we must construct the out-coming density matrix not on the basis of our
arbitrary choice of sampling events, but on what we have actually observed.
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We should not use an arbitrary set of projectors, but only the finest possible
projectors compatible with the resolution of the apparatus. If δ is the sharpest
resolution of the measuring device (say the width of the dots indicating the par-
ticle’s position) the relevant projectors are Pˆ δx , which project onto the interval
[x− δ2 , x+
δ
2 ]. Using these projectors we construct the probabilities
pδ(x1, t1;x2, t2) = Tr
(
eiHˆ(t2−t1)Pˆ δx2e
−iHˆ(t2−t1)Pˆ δx1 ρˆ(t1)Pˆ
δ
x1
)
, (3. 4)
that a dot will be found centered at the point x1 in the first measurement and
then a dot centered at the point x2 in the second measurement.
We may then construct the probabilities for a particle to be found within
a subset Ui of R at time t1 and then within a subset Uj at time t2. For this
purpose, we split each set Ui into mutually exclusive cells uαi of size δ, such
that
∪α uαi = Ui (3. 5)
uαi ∩ uβi = ∅, α 6= β. (3. 6)
If we denote select points xαi ∈ uαi, for all i (xαi may be the midpoint of uαi),
we may construct the probability pδ(Ui, t1;Uj , t2)
pδ(Ui, t1;Uj , t2) =
∑
α
∑
β
pδ(xαi, t1;xβj , t2) (3. 7)
In the limit that the typical size of the sets Uj is much larger than δ, we
may approximate the summation by an integral,
pδ(Ui, t1|Uj , t2) =
1
δ2
∫
Ui
dx1
∫
Uj
dx2pδ(x1, t1;x2, t2), (3. 8)
In other words, the objects 1δ2 pδ(Ui, t1|Uj, t2) play the role of probability den-
sities. The probabilities (3.8) are compatible with the relative frequencies, be-
cause they do satisfy the additivity criterion. Note, however, that they depend
strongly on the resolution δ of the measuring device2.
There exists a systematic error in the definition of the probabilities (3.8),
which is due to the approximation of the sums (3.7) by integrals. This is re-
lated to the fact that the dots have a finite size and hence cannot be definitely
ascertained whether they lie in a sample set Ui or its neighboring one. For
sufficiently large sets Uj , characterised by a typical size L, the ambiguity may
be approximated by a Gaussian distribution and is of the order e−L
2/δ2 .
2If the two -time probabilities did not depend on δ, it would have been possible to describe
the quantum mechanical system in terms of a stochastic process that reproduces all n-point
functions of the quantum mechanical description without making any reference to the mea-
surement apparatus. The generic dependence of n-time probabilities on the measuring device
renders this impossible, in agreement with many constraints placed by Bell’s theorem
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The important feature of the probabilities (3.8) is that they are not func-
tions of the projection operators PUi . They depend on the resolution δ of the
measuring device and the way the sample sets Ui are partitioned into subsets
of size δ. For this reason, different measuring devices lead to different values of
the probabilities (3.8). We may consider, for instance two different measuring
devices, one with resolution δ and one with resolution 2δ. The probabilities cor-
responding to the former will be constructed from the minimal projectors Pˆ δx ,
while the latter from the projectors Pˆ 2δx . Given that Pˆ
2δ
x = Pˆ
δ
x− δ2
+ Pˆ δ
x+ δ2
the
difference between the probabilities pδ(Ui, t1|Uj, t2) and p2δ(Ui, t1|Uj , t2) equals
ǫδ(Ui, t1;Uj , t2) = Re
∫
Ui
dx1
∫
Uj
dx2dδ(x1 + δ/2, x1 − δ/2, t1 : x2, t2), (3. 9)
in terms of the interference term
dδ(x1 + δ/2, x1 − δ/2, t1 : x2, t2) =
Tr
(
eiHˆ(t2−t1)Pˆ δx2e
−iHˆ(t2−t1)Pˆ δx1+δ/2ρˆ(t1)Pˆ
δ
x1−δ/2
)
. (3. 10)
The probabilities for the same events depend on the resolution, unless the in-
terference term vanishes for all δ or if it is number of the order of e−L
2/δ2 . Only
then would the probabilities have a functional dependence on the projectors PU .
This is the case, for instance, when the final projector is equal to the unity, in
which case we recover the single-time results.
3.2 An explicit example
It is instructive to compute the probabilities and the interference term in a
concrete physical system. We assume a non-relativistic free particle in one
dimension, with Hamiltonian H = pˆ
2
2m , where m is the particle’s mass and pˆ its
momentum. It is convenient to employ a Gaussian initial state
ψ(x) =
1
(πσ2)1/4
e−
x2
2σ2
+ipx. (3. 11)
The parameter σ is the position uncertainty, p its mean momentum, and we
assumed without loss of generality that it is cenered around x = 0.
Our device measures position. We shall employ smeared Gaussians instead
of sharp projection operators 3.
〈x|Pˆ δx0 |y〉 = e
−
1
2δ2
(x−x0)
2
δ(x, y) (3. 12)
We are interested in the case that δ << |x0| << σ, namely that the device may
distinguish between different readings that lie close to the center of the initial
state. In that case
Pˆ δx0ψ(x) =
1
(πσ2)1/4
e−
(x−x0)
2
2δ2
+ipx. (3. 13)
3The smeared Gaussians project, in effect, into a fuzzy set, which is quite appropriate for
realistic position measurements
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The above expression is, in fact, a reasonable approximation for any wave func-
tion with spread σ, whose structure does not vary much in the scale of δ.
Assuming that the second measurement takes place at time t, we find
pδ(x, 0;x
′, t) = π
δ
σ
r
1 + r
e−
a
4δ2
(x′−x− p
m
t))2 (3. 14)
dδ(x + δ/2, x− δ/2, 0 : x
′t) = pδ(x, 0;x
′, t)e−ceipδ+
ib
δ
(x′−x− p
m
t),(3. 15)
where
a = 1 +
2r
(1 + r)2
, (3. 16)
b = 2r
(1 − r)2
1 + r2
, (3. 17)
c =
r(1 + 2r − 3r2 + 2r3)
2(1 + r2)2
, (3. 18)
r =
mδ2
t
. (3. 19)
The parameter r is the time-of-flight phase space uncertainty, namely the un-
certainty mδ/t in a time-of-flight determination of the momentum times the
resolution δ. From the equations above, we see that the interference term is of
the same order as the probability irrespective of the value of r.
We will now estimate the difference ǫ between the probabilities for two sets
U1 at time t = 0 and U2 at time t. Both sets are assumed to be of size L >> δ
so that the sampling of the data can be accurate. The set U1 is centered around
the point x1 and the set U2 around x2. We will denote by ∆ = x2 − x1 −
p
m t
the distance between X2 and the evolution of x1 according to the classical
equations of motion. Using Gaussian smeared characteristic functions e−
(x−xi)
2
2L2 ,
to perform the integrations over the sets Ui, we obtain
pδ(U1, 0;U2, t) = k
L
σ
e−
∆2
4L2 , (3. 20)
ǫδ(U1, 0;U2, t) = k
′
L
σ
e−
∆2
4L2 cos
(
pδ +
b∆
δ
)
, (3. 21)
where k and k′ denote terms of the order of unity and according to our original
assumptions L << σ4 . Clearly ǫδ is of the same order of magnitude with
pδ, a fact that emphasises the strong dependence of the probabilities on the
measuring device’s resolution.
We conclude, therefore, that the difference between the two probability as-
signments is of the same order of magnitude as the probabilities themselves
and, consequently, the probabilities for the two-time measurements depend on
the way the sample sets Ui are partitioned with respect to the resolution of the
measuring device and is, therefore, not a function the sets Uj .
4Otherwise, the origin of the set U1 is outside the support of the initial wave-function, and
the corresponding probabilities will be close to zero.
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3.3 Consequences
Our results demonstrate that the probabilities for two-time measurements are
generically not functions of the projection operators that correspond to the sam-
ple sets. This is very much unlike the single time, where the probabilities for
particular events are linear functionals of the projection operators that corre-
spond to the sample sets.
The property above of the single-time quantum probabilities has as conse-
quence that all physical measurements may be described in terms of YES-NO
experiments. A typical such experiment involves a filter –represented by a pro-
jection operator – which is set on the path of a particle beam. We may monitor,
whether a particle passed through the filter or not, and it is possible after N
trials to determine the probability corresponding to a particle passing through
that filter. If we repeat this experiment with different filters that correspond
to the same physical property (the associated projectors commute), we may
eventually reconstruct the probability distribution for this quantity, because
the single time probabilities are additive. Hence, the probabilities Tr(ρˆPˆU ) de-
termined by the filter measurement of, say, position in the set U coincide with
the probabilities determined by the statistical analysis of all dots that were
found in the sample set U in any device that records the particle positions.
For this reason, the projection operator PˆU represents the proposition that the
particle’s position has been measured to lie in the set U , irrespective of the
experimental procedure or the details of the measuring device. From the results
of the YES-NO experiments we can unambiguously reconstruct all probabilistic
information about a physical system. One is led, therefore, to the suggestion
that the projection operators refer to the properties of quantum systems –as
manifested in measurements– and that the structure of the lattice of projection
operators represents the structure of potential quantum mechanical events. One
speaks, therefore, for the quantum logic of quantum mechanical measurements
– or of quantum mechanical properties, if one wishes to move beyond concrete
measurement situations.
In two-time measurements the situation is different. The measured proba-
bilities are not functions of the single-time projectors. They depend instead on
the properties of the measuring device and the way each sample set is resolved
into minimum resolution sets. One may still perform two-time YES-NO exper-
iments, by directing the particles through two successive filters. The expression
(2.7) may be employed to this experiment. But the filter measurements do
not suffice to reconstruct the two-times probability assignment to the physical
quantity they represent; the physical probabilities for the two-time experiments
are given by equation (3.8) and not by equation (2.7). A filter measurement for
position may be, for example, realised in terms of a wall with a slit of width L
in it, which represents a subset U of R . This is a very different physical system
from the one we described earlier, which records any possible position with an
accuracy of δ. There is no a priori physical reason that the probability that
the particle will cross the slit will be the same with the probability obtained
from the relative frequencies of the events within U in the latter measurement.
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In single-time measurements they happen to be the same, but in two-time ones
they are not.
In other words, the YES-NO experiments do not capture all physical infor-
mation about two time measurements – the physical predictions depend strongly
on the properties of the measuring devices. Hence the proposition that the par-
ticle is measured at time t1 within the set U1 and at time t2 within the set U2
is not universally represented by the ordered pair of projectors (PˆU1 , PˆU2). It
is only represented by these projectors when the measuring device consists of
two filters – the first with a slit corresponding to U1 and the second with a slit
corresponding to U2. There is, therefore, no universality in the representation of
measurement outcomes by pairs of projection operators, with the consequence
that the interpretation of two-time measurements in terms of quantum logic is
not possible.
We may make, in fact, a stronger statement: even for single-time measure-
ments the interpretation in terms of quantum logic is not possible. The proof
involves reductio ad absurdum. We represent the single-time lattice of projection
operators on a Hilbert space H as L(H) and assume that each measurement
outcome may be uniquely represented by an element of L(H) –the converse
need not be true. Two successive measurement outcomes should, therefore, be
represented by a pair of elements of L(H), hence an element of L(H)× L(H)5.
We have showed that this is not the case. Hence there exists an error in our
assumptions. The statement that two measurement outcomes are represented
by a pair of arguments of L(H) is a consequence of basic principles of logical
reasoning (and a basic axiom of set theory). Unless we assume that a two-time
measurement does not correspond to two single-time measurements6, we are
forced to conclude that the universal representation of measurement outcomes
by projection operators is not valid even in single-time measurements. The
reason it seems possible to do so, is because in single-time measurements the
interference term d of equation (2.9) always vanishes.
The conclusion above is, in a sense, complementary to many theorems about
5The lattice of two-time measurement outcomes should contain L(H) × L(H) as a subset
–not necessarily a sublattice. Such is the case, for instance, in Isham’s scheme [8], where the
lattice of two-time measurements is represented by the lattice of projectors on L(H ⊗H).
6Elaborating on Bohr’s interpretation of measurement, it is possible to assume that a
two-time measurement should not be analysed conceptually into two-single time ones. Any
measurement refers to an irreducible physical set-up and a two-time measurement should be
considered as irreducible as a single-time one. This is, however, an extreme position, which
goes much further than Bohr’s explanation of the Einstein-Podolski-Rosen (EPR) argument.
The present argument is not, whether there exist correlations between the results of two
successive measurements, but whether we may represent –conceptually – the results of a two-
time measurement as a pair of single time measurement. The corresponding thesis for the EPR
experiment would be to assume that there is no way to represent separately the measurement
outcomes on the two physical subsystems – to even consider physical observables that refer to
each subsystem. Such a position is logically consistent, but it is so alien to the way we actually
perform experiments as to be physically untenable. The results of a two-time measurement
of position are always two readings of position. One simply cannot refute this fact. But even
if we accepted such a destructive thesis, we would still face the fact that the outcomes of
irreducible measurements (now meaning the two-time ones) cannot be universally represented
by projection operators.
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contextuality in quantum theory [10, 11]. Since a given projector may be a spec-
tral projector of two non-commuting self-adjoint operators, one should always
make a choice of the corresponding self-adjoint operator (the context) before
employing that projector to represent a property of a physical system [12]. Our
results refer to concrete measurement situations, and for this reason their con-
clusions are rather stronger. Not only is it impossible to represent a measure-
ment outcome by a projection operator, but the observed probabilities depend
explicitly on specific properties of the measurement device7.
There exist many interpretation schemes that employ the lattice of pro-
jection operators to universally represent properties of physical systems, even
outside the measurement context. What we have demonstrated here is that the
universal representation of measurement outcomes by projection operators is
untenable. It is, therefore, a priori not contradictory to assume that projection
operators refer to properties of a physical system outside the context of mea-
surements. We will not comment in this paper, whether this thesis is tenable
or not. We only remark that it is an entirely ad hoc hypothesis in the light of
our results. The quantum logic of properties of a physical systems cannot be
considered as a generalisation of a quantum logic for measurements.
Our conclusions are independent of the interpretation for the quantum state
(whether it is objective or subjective, whether it refers to individual systems or
to ensembles). They are also independent of the interpretation of measurement
theory (whether we employ subjective conditional probabilities, or we think that
the reduction of the wave packet is a physical process, or there is a duality of a
classical measuring device and a quantum system).
We must distinguish the two different roles of the sample sets U and the
corresponding projectors – a distinction that is not usually made in probability
theory. A sample set U may represent a physical event, if the device can not
distinguish between the elements of U . In that case U refers to a concrete empir-
ical fact. It may also represent a statement about the physical system, namely
that an event has been found within the set U . The latter case, however, is not
a representation of a physical fact. It is at the discretion of the experimentalist
to choose the set U that he will use for the sampling of its results. The phys-
ical probabilities should, therefore, be constructed with the first interpretation
of the sample sets in mind. These probabilities then depend then on the con-
struction of the physical apparatus and interaction with the measured system.
They may also depend on the initial state of the measured system: ultra-fast
neutrons, for instance, will leave a different trace on a recording material than
slow ones. The out-coming density matrix (3.2) should, in principle, be deter-
mined by the common reasoning that is employed in the design of experiments:
treating the apparatus as classical and the measured system as quantum. The
results of such an analysis would not yield an expression in terms of projection
operators for the minimum resolution. There exists a degree of fuzziness in
any measurement, and for this reason the natural mathematical objects that
7The same conclusion holds for approximate projectors as can be seen from the results
in out model system. Fuzzy measurements cannot save us from the generic dependence of
quantum mechanical probabilities on the measuring apparatus.
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encode the effect of minimal resolution should be smeared projectors: positive
operators with supremum norm less than one [13].
The representation of quantum mechanical measurement outcomes by pro-
jection operators is a consequence of a principle that is often considered as a
basic axiom of quantum mechanics: The possible outcomes in the measurement
of a physical quantity represented by a self-adjoint operator Aˆ lie in the spec-
trum of Aˆ. This postulate implies that sample sets of the measurement of Aˆ
correspond to the measurable subsets of the operator’s spectrum and, due to the
spectral theorem, to the spectral projectors of Aˆ. Our results suggest strongly
that this postulate may not be appropriate in quantum theory. Its abandon-
ment would not change any physical predictions – an axiomatic framework for
standard quantum mechanics is still possible in its absence. The mean values
and all higher moments for measurements of any observable may still be ob-
tained through the usual rules of quantum theory. The only difference is that
the spectral resolution of an operator does not necessarily correspond to the
physical resolution of the measured values of the physical quantity. We have
discussed this issue in references [14, 15], to which we refer the reader for more
details.
To summarise our results, if we accept that the relative frequencies for two-
time measurements converge, we inevitably conclude that
i. The probabilities for two specific sample sets in a two-time measurement
is not a function of the projection operators that, supposedly, correspond to
each sample set.
ii. The YES-NO experiments do not suffice to reconstruct all physical pre-
dictions of quantum theory for two-time measurements.
iii. Projection operators cannot, in general, represent properties of a physi-
cal system. They are only relevant to the probabilities of specific YES-NO
experiments.
iv. Unlike classical probability theory, quantum theory distinguishes sharply
between physical events and propositions about physical events.
4 An alternative explanation
Our resolution of the ‘paradox’ of two-time measurements and the subsequent
analysis was based on the assumption that the measured frequencies of events
define probabilities, i.e. that the sequences (2.5) converge. We are then led to
a reconsideration of the use of the conditional probability for the derivation of
(2.7). The conclusion that probabilities depend rather strongly on the properties
of the physical device, is rather disturbing. It implies that the results of two
sets of measurements that involve an identical preparation of the physical system
and very similar measuring apparatus would differ according to rather trivial
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details of the apparatus’s manufacture.
There exists an alternative solution to the problem, but its implication are
more disturbing rather than less. It is conceivable that the sequences do not
converge to probabilities. They could perhaps exhibit an oscillating behavior as
N → ∞. This possibility has not, to the best of our knowledge, been refuted
by any experiment that has been performed so far. In that case probabilities
cannot be defined for two-time measurement. The expressions (2.7) cannot,
therefore, be considered as referring to probabilities. In fact, we have no idea
how to interpret them.
The hypothesis that two-times probabilities are not defined is not incompat-
ible with the successful use of probability theory for single-time measurements.
Probabilities are additive for single-time measurement – just as relative frequen-
cies are– and there is no problem in that case to assume that the sequences (2.5)
converge. The same would be true for any sufficiently coarse-grained measure-
ments, for which the interference term vanishes. One would be, therefore, led to
the interpretation of the object |Re d(U1, Uj;U2, Uj)| as a measure of the non-
convergence of the sequence of relative frequencies. Probabilities would, there-
fore, be definable only for specific samplings of the measurement outcomes, such
that the consistency condition Re d(U1, Uj;U2, Uj) = 0 holds. This is, in fact,
similar to the use of probabilities by the consistent histories approach – proba-
bilities are defined only for sufficiently coarse-grained partitions of the two-time
sample space, such that the consistency condition is satisfied.
The second alternative is perhaps too radical. It would involve a reappraisal
of the use of probabilities in physical theories. We would have to extend both
the theory of probability and quantum theory in a way that will deal with
non-convergent sequences of relative frequencies. It is not clear, how this may
be achieved, what generalisations are physically relevant, and which parts of
the quantum mechanical formalism, if any, would have to be abandoned. As
far as the explanation of the non-convergence of frequencies is concerned, we
may only speculate. Perhaps, the set-up of two time measurements does not
lead to the probabilities of quantum equilibrium – in the sense of Bohmian
mechanics [16]. Or, perhaps, it is due to a physical reason unsuspected by
any current interpretation or reformulation of quantum theory. In absence of
conclusive empirical evidence, we find more prudent to refrain from any detailed
speculation on this issue.
The hypothesis of non-converging frequencies seems much less plausible than
the alternative we considered in the previous sections. However, it is a priori
possible that physical phenomena cannot be entirely described in terms of prob-
abilities. In any case, this issue can be resolved by recourse to experiment. It
should not be very difficult to design and execute experiments that will mea-
sure particle positions at two moments of time. A careful statistical analysis
of the measurement outcomes will then allow us to clearly distinguish whether
the relative frequencies converge or not. If they do not, then it would be a
strong argument in support of the incompleteness of the current formulation of
quantum theory.
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